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Introduction 
In 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a new set of capital standards 
that have collectively referred to as the Basel II Accord. This Accord has undergone an extensive 
consultative period, and the final version was released in 2004.  The Accord has three 
fundamental pillars: 1) minimum capital requirements, 2) supervisory review, and 3) market 
discipline. The Basel II Accord retains the basic definition of bank capital and the market risk 
provisions of the 1996 Amendment, but substantially changes methods for evaluating credit risk, 
emphasizing frequency and severity of loan defaults. It also establishes guidelines to determine 
the economic capital needed by financial institutions to protect themselves from market, credit, 
and operating risk.   
 
The Basel II Accord has generated a series of incentives for financial institutions to develop 
models that assess credit risk and to allocate their economic capital to different segments of their 
portfolios. Understanding the credit risk of these portfolios is of critical importance for lenders 
and for regulators, and provisions in the Basel II Accord establish guidelines to assist financial 
institutions in screening borrowers, and in determining how much credit should be extended and 
at what price given the institution risk bearing capacity. The proposal prescribes relationships 
between expected risk and the real return on investments, and recognizes the linkage between 
capital levels and the realized rate of return on equity (Gustafson et al, 2003). At the same time, 
better credit risk assessment allows regulators to be assured that institutions have adequate 
capital to tolerate prescribed levels of insolvency. 
 
Agricultural lenders generally have less developed credit risk models than commercial banks, but 
more specific industry knowledge and informal credit evaluation methods. The implementation 
of the Basel II Accord will require agricultural financial institutions to change their credit risk 
models, implement new risk rating systems while collecting and gathering more information 
from each borrower; and to improve their technologies and processes for collecting and 
managing data. Currently, there are no standard risk-rating models used by agricultural financial 
institutions since the quality of data differs among institution in terms of loan types and 
approaches. This makes these type of institutions less competitive and vulnerable to major risk. 
Furthermore, given inherent difficulties in data acquisition, fewer advances have been made with 
respect to agricultural credit portfolios in general.  Zech (2003) indicates that one of the primary 
limitations in using credit risk models that follow the Basel II Accord is the quality of the 
information. For example, the Internal Rating-Based (IRB) Approach mandates five years of 
Probability of Default (PD) and seven years of Loss Given Default (LGD) estimates to be 
available.  
 
Furthermore, the Accord does not differentiate among sectors such as agriculture and industry, 
making it difficult for agricultural lenders to adopt the Accord as some of the assumptions used 
when modeling credit risk in commercial banking may not hold for agricultural financial 
institutions (Zech, 2003). As a consequence, developing of robust risk-rating model is essential 
for agricultural lenders to reduce credit risk by accurately determine borrowers’ creditworthiness, 
as well to determine the economic capital that they are required to hold to avoid being 
overcapitalized and, therefore lose profitable investment opportunities.  A parallel benefit of 
having an accurate credit risk assessment model is that it helps management to identify and 
remove borrowers that present excessive credit risk, and to determine how much credit should be   3
extended and at what price to eligible borrowers.  Credit risk assessment assists institutions in 
aligning their expectations for risk and return.   
 
The agricultural finance literature on credit scoring has developed alternative statistical models 
and data sets that provide a useful description of several alternative statistical approaches on 
which to score credit (Chhikara, 1989).  One of the objectives of applied research on credit risk 
assessment models is to identify good model characteristics.  This study represents an empirical 
investigation of the probability of default within a loan portfolio to determine the set of 
characteristics to incorporate in a risk-rating model, as there is no uniformly adopted risk-rating 
model in the applied finance literature. The hypothesis behind the model is that the likelihood of 
repayment (default) and borrower creditworthiness can be determined by applying statistical 
models to measurable characteristics of borrowers at the individual transaction level following 
the New Basel Accord.  Institutions that do adopt the New Basel Accord would have to 
standardize, at least partially, their data collection methods before employing a reliable internal 
rating based approach. Among major agricultural lenders, AgriBank is relatively well prepared to 
adopt the Basel II Guidelines as it has been collecting data and developing internal rating 
systems for more than 5 years already.   
 
The general objective of this study is to asses the impact of the Basel II guidelines on measures 
of AgriBank credit risk. The specific objectives are the following: 
-  Estimate the probability of default for each loan in the portfolio of AgriBank while 
incorporating the guidelines of the New Basel Capital Accord, 
-  Test three alternative definitions of default and estimate different prediction models for 
default, 
-  Assess different data categories for the estimation of default probability (origination 
process, loan type, association, payment frequency) 
-  Identify models with superior predictive capabilities to quantify credit risk and estimate 
capital requirements for agricultural lenders (AgriBank) under the New Basel Capital 
Accord 
-  Measure time patterns of default and incorporate them into the predictive default models 
 
New Basel Accord (Basel II) 
In 1999, the Basel Committee proposed a new capital accord referred to as the Basel II Accord.  
This proposal undertook an extensive consultative period ending up with the committee releasing 
additional proposals for consultation in 2001 and 2003.  The finalized Basel II Accord was 
released in 2004 and has three pillars: 1) minimum capital requirements, 2) supervisory review, 
and 3) market discipline.  The Basel II Accord retains the definition of bank capital and the 
market risk provisions of the 1996 Amendment.  It replaces the old treatment of credit risk, and it 
requires capital for operating risk.
1  The basic capital requirement for banks can be calculated 
dividing capital by the sum of credit risk, market risk and operating risk.  This ratio needs to be 
greater or equal to 8%.  As with market risk under the 1996 Amendment, banks have options as 
to how they value their credit risk and market risk. For credit risk, they can choose from among 
the Standardized Approach, the Foundation Internal Rating-Based (IRB) Approach, and the 
                                                 
1 Operational risk refers to direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or from external 
events   4
Advanced-IRB Approach.  For operating risk, the choices are among the Basic Indicator 
Approach, the Standardized Approach, and an Internal Measurement Approach.   
 
The Basel II Accord seeks to improve the existing rules by aligning regulatory capital 
requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks and financial institutions face and to 
promote a modern approach to capital supervision. The Basel II Accord requires banks to 
identify the risks they face today and the risks they may face in the future and to improve their 
ability to manage them.  The changes in the financial conditions due to the Basel II Accord can 
be summarized as follows: 1) the new accord requires financial institutions to reevaluate their 
credit, market and operating risk in order to ensure the safety and soundness of capital 
management, 2) the accord requires new classes in the internal risk-rating and the use of a dual 
risk-rating system (Probability of default (PD) and potential loss given default occurs (PLD))
2, 
and 3) it suggests eight criteria for banks to measure when implementing a risk-rating system 
including the evaluation of a firm’s repayment capacity, solvency, earning, operating leverage, 
financial efficiency, liquidity, management, and industry standing.  
 
Impact of Basel Accord in Agricultural Financial Institutions 
It is important to recognize that large and internationally financial institutions are required to 
adopt the Basel II guidelines. Agricultural financial institutions will also have to complying with 
the Basel II guidelines; therefore, it is important to recognize the necessity to review the impact 
of these measures for banks and firms that are subject to prudential banking or securities 
regulation.  There are several issues that have to be addressed by financial institutions with 
respect to the treatment of double-default effects for covered transactions, short-term maturity 
adjustments; the internal ratings-based approach; improvements to the current trading book 
regime, especially with respect to the treatment of specific risk; and the design of a specific 
capital treatment for failed transactions and transactions that are not settled through a delivery-
versus-payment framework (non-DvP).  Agricultural finance institutions need to be able to 
respond to three basic questions in order to assess the implication of implementing the Basel II: 
1) How much risk is present? 2) What should be the institutional tolerance to risk? and 3) How 
much capital is needed to offset that risk?  Barry (2001) points out that answering these questions 
is necessary to manage risk effectively.  
 
The implementation of Basel II could adversely affect the competitive position of agricultural 
finance institutions that do not adopt the advanced internal risk ratings-based (A-IRB).  For 
example, the A-IRB may reduce the minimum regulatory capital and thereby lower the marginal 
costs of agricultural lending for adopters.  The substitution effect of a decline in marginal costs at 
A-IRB agricultural finance institutions relative to non-A-IRB institutions may encourage A-IRB 
finance institutions to reduce prices or, increase quantities of agricultural lending.  This could 
potentially lead to other financial institutions lowering the prices that they charge and could cut 
their market shares.  
 
In the U.S., the adoption of Basel II could have significant competitive effects in the market for 
any assets or off-balance sheet activities in which the A-IRB agricultural finance institutions 
have substantially lower or higher capital requirements than the Basel I requirements to which 
the non-A-IRB agricultural finance institutions are subject.  Thus, the adoption of the Basel II 
                                                 
2 The probability of default indicates how frequently a loss may occur, while loss given default indicates the severity of the default    5
Accord can benefit agricultural financial institutions by allowing them to increase the 
segmentation of their loan portfolios by risk rating and result the better management of risk and 
capital provision.  Under the Basel II proposal, banks with sufficiently sophisticated risk 
measurement and management systems can use their own internal systems to estimate key risk 
parameters that determine regulatory capital minimums. 
 
The implementation of the Basel II will require agricultural financial institution to change their 
credit risk models implementing new risk rating systems while collecting and gathering more 
information for each borrower and improving their technologies and processes to collect data. 
Zech (2003) indicates that one of the biggest limitations in using a credit risk model that follows 
the Basel II accord is the quality of the information since for example for the IRB Approach, five 
years of PD and seven years of LGD are required. Furthermore, the accord does not differentiate 
between sectors such as agriculture, industry and so forth making it more difficult for 
agricultural lenders to adopt the Accord since some of the assumptions used when modeling 
credit risk in commercial banking may not be the same for agricultural financial institutions 
(Zech, 2003).  Barry (2001) indicates, “Agricultural lending is characterized by the cyclical 
performance of farm business, length, seasonal production pattern, high capital intensity (real 
state), extensive leasing of farmland, participation in government programs, and annual versus 
monthly payments on intermediate and long-term loans”.  Barry (2001) also argued that even 
thought loan losses are infrequently in agricultural lending, the losses can be significant and be 
highly correlated across production units, geographic areas and time due to the lack of diversity 
among farms.  He also pointed out that risk and capital adequacy problems might arrive through 
higher lending cost for small-business and reduced earning from lending rather than loan losses. 
 
The successful implementation of the Basel II accord depends on both lenders and regulators 
understanding the special circumstances of each type of business. This is particularly true in the 
case of credit risk management in agricultural lending institutions.  
 
Credit risk assessment models in Agriculture 
The purpose of a credit risk assessment is to evaluate the risk exposure of lenders and 
shareholders at the transaction and portfolio levels given the fact that high credit risk might 
affect negatively the rate of returns on a loan portfolio.  Gustafson, et al. (2003) argue that credit 
risk model seek to asses the borrower’s creditworthiness by applying econometric methods to 
measurable characteristics at the individual transaction level.  Credit score models are used to 
predict the likelihood of loan repayments or loan defaults incorporating specific measurable 
factors that cluster borrowers in different risk groups that reflect their creditworthiness. These 
models are also useful to assist in loan approval decisions, loan pricing and to meet regulatory 
requirements (Ellinger et al., 1992).  Gustafson, et al. (2003) indicates that one of the limitations 
of the credit risk models is that they usually do not account for misclassification costs or, the 
degree of defaults in a loan portfolio.
3 Traditionally, credit risk assessment is based on 
quantitative assessment tools such as credit scoring models as well as lenders’ own qualitative 
criteria concerning the management capacity and repayment capacity of the borrowers. However, 
in recent years, quantitative risk evaluation models have become increasingly important and have 
                                                 
3 Misclassification cost refers to Type I and Type II errors, where Type I occurs when a bad borrower is consider acceptable while Type II error 
occurs when a bad borrower is classified as acceptable.   6
evolved into complex models that are more accurately able to predict borrower behaviors and 
better assess management capacity and repayment capacity.  
 
The attention to credit score models by agricultural lenders has increased during the 1980’s and 
1990’s due to the large number of loan defaults by failure farms (Turvey, 1991).  Prior to the 
1970’s, credit risk evaluation relied primarily on subjective assessments such as how well the 
lender knew the farmer and the size of loan (Gustafson et al., 2003).  Since then, agricultural 
finance institutions and researchers have developed quantitative and less subjective decision 
criteria to evaluate borrower risk.  Allcott (1985), Kohl and Forbes (1982), Kohl (1987) and 
Tongate (1984) developed methods that include comprehensive financial measures such as 
liquidity, solvency, profitability, efficiency, repayment capacity, and management ability.  
 
Fisher and Moore (1987) proposed a logistic function with fewer explanatory variables to 
address the problem of multivariate normality of explanatory variables.  Miller and LaDue 
(1989) used the logistic method with borrower repayment based on ratio theory data instead of 
subjective lender information.  They also accounted for covariance between regions and farm 
types and considered costs of misclassification.  Gustafson et al. (2003) reported that Lufborrow, 
Barry and Dixon (1984) were the first ones to link credit assessment with loan pricing using a 
probit model and claimed that their results enabled lenders to advise borrowers to improve their 
credit score.  Barry and Ellinger (1989) built up a multi-period model that endogenized credit, 
investment and loan pricing decisions.  LaDue (1990) developed sixteen financial ratios in 
cooperation with agricultural bankers in an effort to standardize the information requirement by 
lenders resulting in the creation of the Farm Financial Standards Taskforce.  Chhikara (1989) and 
Gustafson (1988) supported to implementation of portfolio analysis type of models to assess 
credit risk since most previous studies limited themselves to only default rates. 
 
Turvey (1991) compared and contrasted the performance of four alternative credit evaluation 
models such as discrimant analysis (DA), probit, logit, and linear probability (LPM), and found 
that the four methods have similar classification accuracies.  However, the LPM and DA 
techniques have some estimation problems when correcting for heteroscedasticity (LPM) and the 
assumption of normally distributed random variables (DA).  On the other hand, the probit and 
logit are less restrictive in terms of the underlying distributional assumption. Gustafson et al. 
(2003) argue in favor of the change in the direction of credit risk research around 1980’s, 
recognizing the asymmetric information problem.  Borrowers know more about their credit risk 
than lenders because they are more familiar with their business, financial position and repayment 
intentions.  Gustafson et al. (2003) argued that asymmetric information is the source of adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems
4 and point out that lenders have responded to these 
problems by focusing on relationship information including borrower motivation, commitment, 
and intentions.  Ellinger et al. (1992a) found that overall model consistency is better when 
predicting low performance loans than when predicting high performance loans; however the 
differences when using subjective measures such as management affect negatively the 
consistency among models. Model consistency decreased as more detail analysis such as type of 
loan, purpose of loan and type of borrowers were included (Gustafson et al., 2003).  Data 
                                                 
4 Adverse selection occurs when the lender is unable to distinguish between high- and low-risk borrowers. Moral hazard is the ability of a 
borrower to use loan funds to engage in activities that are riskier than the lender anticipated. Only the borrower can know their true intentions for 
the loaned funds and their future ability and willingness to repay the loan   7
limitations in terms of number of year available and consistency between institutions make it 
hard to validate the credit score models since there is no uniform model used by lenders. 
Gustafson et al. (2003) conclude that “it is not surprising that a significant part of the recent 
agricultural finance literature has focused on the potential for improving the consistency (or 
robustness) of the models”.   
 
This review reveals that there is a lack of concern regarding which models apply to different loan 
types or business, which variables are most important to use to predict loan performance, or 
which models are most suitable for specific type of data.  Miller and LaDue (1989) found that no 
specific factor has consistently been used in the credit-scoring framework and that there is a huge 
variety among models in the literature. Variables that have been considered by authors to 
measure credit risks include: borrower liquidity, leverage, collateral, repayment ability, 
repayment history, profitability, efficiency measures, farm type, geographic region, and financial 
and non-financial factors.  
 
Gallagher (2001) indicates that a prediction model without non-financial variables would suffer 
from model misspecification.  He combined non-financial characteristics of loans such as 
manager, lender experience, and the use of a financial adviser to see which agribusiness loans 
perform better. Zech and Pederson (2003), using a linear and logistic regression models, 
identified the debt-to-asset ratio as a major predictor of repayment ability. They also found that 
factors such as family living expenses and farm financial efficiency are excellent predictors of 
overall financial performance, however the authors indicate that the lack of robustness of risk-
rating models is evident confirming that models developed for specific periods may not be used 
for subsequent periods.  Katchova and Barry (2005) developed models for quantifying credit risk 
in agricultural lending. They calculated probabilities of default, loss given default, portfolio risk, 
and correlations using data from farm businesses. They showed that the expected and unexpected 
losses under the Basel II Accord critically depend on the credit quality of the loan portfolio and 
the correlations among farm performances. 
 
Another important change in the direction of credit risk research is the recognition that assuming 
a specific distribution to model credit risk restricts the applicability of the model and may 
undermine its results. Thus, a proliferation of nonparametric approaches such as recursive 
partitioning algorithms and mathematical programming techniques have been implemented and 
compared to those obtained with parametric statistical approaches (Gustafson et al., 2003). For 
example, Ziara et al. (1995) found that either mathematical programming techniques or statistical 
models performed equally well, and that mixed integer-programming models perform better than 
parametric models.  One clear advantage of non-parametric model is that they can fit several 
distribution functions and mathematical function, and at the same time, they are flexible enough 
for sensibility analysis.  Furthermore, when the data sample is small or the data is contaminated, 
non-parametric model may behave better (Gustafson et al., 2003). 
Credit risk migration analysis has been also used to model credit risk in agriculture. Phillips and 
Katchova (2004) used annual migration rates of credit scores to test path dependence conditional 
on the business cycle.  They found that upgrades to credit scores are followed by downgrades.  In 
addition, upgrades are more likely to occur in an economic expansion phase while downgrades 
are more likely in economic recession.  Escalante et al. (2005) used a probit regression for 
determining path dependence by accounting for demographic, financial, and macroeconomic   8
variables such as farmland value, aggregate money supply, the S&P 500 Index, and long-term 
agricultural interest rates. Using data from agricultural banks, Gloy et al. (2006) conducted a 
credit risk migration study.  He used a logistic regression model to assess credit downgrades and 
found that the probability of a downgrade is different among lending institutions and when farms 
are facing a downgrade economic cycle, they are more likely to downgrade. 
 
Engelman, Hayden and Tashe (2003) provide an empirical comparison of the logit model and the 
Altman’s score Z-core (discriminate analysis on a large sample of SMEs. They show that the 
logit model significantly outperforms Altman’s score Z-core in terms of rank ordering (the ROC 
coefficient). Featherstone et al. (2006) used data on loans in the Seventh Farm Credit District 
Portfolio to model loan defaults and map them into S&P probability of bond default for publicly 
rated companies.  The authors employed a binary logit model to calculate the PD for each loan 
before mapping it to the S&P publicly rated firms.  They discovered that repayment capacity, 
owner equity, and working capital origination loans are determinants of PD. 
 
Data employed 
The data employed for this study was obtained from AgriBank, a lending institution in the Farm 
Credit System (FCS).5  AgriBank is a member-owned cooperative that provides credit for 
agriculture to the shareholders in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.  AgriBank was established in 1992 when the Farm Credit Banks of St. Louis merged 
with the Farm Credit Banks of St. Paul.  Subsequent mergers took place in 1994 and 2003 with 
the Farm Credit Bank of Louisville and with AgAmerica Farm Credit Bank, respectively. 
AgriBank has more than $47 billion in assets and around $2 billion in equity.   
 
The database obtained from AgriBank contains information from two sources: 1) customer 
financial information (371,260.00 observations) which includes data such as income, asset, 
collateral, financial ratios and balance sheet information, and 2) the default database (460,274.00 
observations) which contains loan level information such as loan amount, repayment capacity, 
working capital, payments information and dates, etc. The study utilizes AgriBank’s loan level 
data rather than customer level data.  The data based was cleaned by removing master notes with 
association and participations, negative values or non-commitment (unless scored loans) and 
leases.  Records with blank or missing underwriting fields (liquidity, solvency and repayment 
capacity) were also removed from the database. 
  
According to the guidelines of the New Basel Capital Accord, four conditions need to be met for 
a loan to be considered in default: 1) the borrower could not pay in full her obligations; 2) the 
loan is past due for 90 days or more; 3) a credit loss event happened, for example a write off, 
specific provision, debt restructuring, interest or fees, etc; 4) the borrower has filed for 
bankruptcy.   The database does not contain a specific variable for default; therefore, in this 
study, default was defined in three different ways.  First, a loan that has been 90 days past due or 
more at least one time since origination was considered to be in default.  Some loans that appear 
under the category of 120 days past-due were not recorded in the 92 days past due category, thus 
                                                 
5 The Farm Credit System (System) is a network of borrower-owned lending institutions and related service organizations serving all 50 states 
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. These institutions specialize in providing credit and related services to farmers, ranchers, and producers 
or harvesters of aquatic products.   9
to avoid excluding them from the default category, all loans that were more than 90 days past 
due were considered delinquent.  This measure of default is consistent with the literature and is 
used by the industry as well.  The second default measure is similar to the first one with key 
difference being that default loans have to be non-accrual loans as well.  The accrual code points 
out those loans that were classified as non-accrual without first being classified in any other past-
due category.  The third definition of default loan extends this second definition to include those 
loans in which the borrowers has filed for bankruptcy.  
 
All three variables (definitions) take a value of one if the default has occurred, or a zero if one 
has not.  The third default definition follows all the New Accord’s conditions since the definition 
used by AgriBank for non-accrual loans status is consistent with the concept of unlikeness to pay 
obligations (i.e. loans are placed in non-accrual status when the principal or interest is delinquent 
for 90 days or more).  Thus, definition three satisfies conditions one and two of the Accord.  The 
third condition is fulfilled by default and fourth condition is captured by the Litigation_code 
variable that indicates whether a loan is in litigation (one category within this variable is 
bankruptcy).  Given these three conditions of default, 217 observations were deleted from the 
database since they did not include information that indicated if they had, at any point in time, 
been in default (i.e. they included missing observations).  Furthermore, data entries that did not 
contain information about the origination process were assessed for abnormalities and a further 
3354 observations were deleted.  The resulting dataset contained 456,703 observations. 
 
For practical purposes, it was assumed that the probability of default related to the remaining 
lifetime of the loan.  Furthermore, in order to be consistent, all the variables employed in this 
paper were based on origination data since some type of loans such as mortgage loans do not 
contain updated financial variables, or should not be updated at any time (i.e. the variable owner 
equity percentage).   
 
Econometric Model 
To calculate the probability of default, a binomial logit model is employed. This approach is 
consistent with Barry, Sherrick and Featherstone (2005) and Featherstone, Roessler and Barry 
(2006).  The logistic regression method is used when the dependent variable is a dichotomous 
and the independent variables are of continuous and/or categorical.  It is also used to determine 
the percent of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables.  Logit 
regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the probability of a certain event 
occurring by calculating the changes in the log odds of the dependent variable and not the 
changes in the dependent variable itself as is the case of OLS regression.
6 The maximum 
likelihood method is consistent and asymptotically efficient (large sample produces normally 
distributed estimates) which allows researchers to use typical hypothesis testing techniques 
(Cramer, 1986 and Eliason, 1993).  Logistic regression does not assume a linear relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables, does not require normally distributed 
variables and do not assume homoscedasticity.  However, it does require independent 
observations and that the independent variables are linearly related to the logit of the dependent 
variable.   
 
                                                 
6 The logs odds refer to the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not.   10
The logit regression has the advantage that it always returns a probability between zero and one 
overcoming the inherently unbounded problem of linear functions.  Westgaard and Van der Wijst 
(2001) indicate that logit and probit models are especially useful to overcome the problem of the 
bounded dependent variable since they transform the probabilities in such a way that they are no 
longer bounded.
7  In the logit model, the upper bound is removed by transforming the probability 
p to the odds ratio of p/(1-p) while the lower bound is removed by taking the logarithm of the 
odd ratio: ln (p/(1-p)). These transformations make the logit model linear in log-odds, making the 
coefficients easier to interpret compared to the coefficients found in probit models.  Thus, to 
determine the probability of default of any loan within the AgriBank portfolio of loans 
conditional on the realization of its variables (financial ratios), the following empirical model 
was used: 
 
Eq. 1      01 12 23 3
prob. of default
ln ( ) ...
1-prob. of default
II xxx x ι β ββ β βε = ++ ++ + +  
 
Where β0 is a constant, βi (i=1…I) are re the parameter estimates, xn (i=1…I) are the explanatory 
variables and ε is an error term.  
 
In this logit estimation, “default” and “non-default” variable is the dependent variable, and this 
variable is regressed against a set of dependent variables.  The New Basel Accord suggests eight 
criteria for implementing a risk-rating system: 1) repayment capacity, 2) solvency, 3) earnings, 
4) operating leverage, 5) financial efficiency, 6) liquidity, 7) management and 8) industry 
standing.  Some of these criteria were employed as independent variables.  In particular, liquidity 
was approximate by the working capital to average gross income ratio, solvency measured as 
owner equity as a percentage of the loan, and repayment capacity measured as the CDRC 
percentage at the loan level.  Due to lack of data, the remaining criteria were not approximated. 
Later in the estimation process, other independent variables were included to explore different 
model specifications and additional information data up to five prior sets of customer-level 
financial statement were used to adjust for seasonality effects on the probability of default. 
Predicted Probabilities 
For a given set of values for the independent variables, the predicted probability in a binary 
regression model is defined as follow: 
 
E q .   2        ˆ Pr( 1| ) ( ) yx x β == Φ 
 
Where Φis the cumulative distribution function for the logistic distribution with a variance of 
2 /3 π  . 
Marginal Change 
The marginal change is defined as follow: 
 
                                                 
7 The difference between the logit and probit is that the probit uses a normal distribution approach instead of the logit distribution which has 
thicker tails than the normal distribution. In practice, there is no difference unless there are too many extreme observations in the sample (Green, 
1993)   11
Eq. 3      
ˆ Pr( 1| ) ( )








The value of the marginal change depends on the level of all variables in the model.  It is 
typically computed with all variables held at their means; however, it may also be calculated by 
obtaining the marginal change for each observation in the dataset and then taking the average 
across all values.  
 
Empirical Results for Traditional Loans 
The logit estimation employed default and non-default as dependent variable and was regressed 
against several set of variables as indicated in the previous section. For loans evaluated under the 
traditional approach, the following independent variables were included: a) Capital debt 
repayment capacity as a percentage of the loan (CDRC).  This variable indicates the borrowers’ 
ability to generate sustainable earnings adequate to service debt on a continuous basis, b) original 
owner equity percentage on which the loan decision was made, c) working capital to average 
gross income ratio, which is considered a relative measure that indicates the adequacy of 
working capital compared to the size of business.  
 
The econometric analysis was conducted in STATA using the logit command.  Observations that 
did not have values for all variables (liquidity, solvency and repayment capacity) were removed 
as indicated above.  In addition, observations that do not have values for at least two variables 
were dropped when estimating the regression leaving a sample of 438,312 observations.  The 
regression results for the probability of default for traditionally evaluated loans are shown in 
Table 1.  Using the first definition of default, the likelihood ratio has a chi-square of 743.46 with 
a p-value of 0.000 indicating that the model as a whole fits significantly better than the reduced 
model.  The coefficients for the owner equity percentage and for the working capital as a 
percentage of the gross income are both significantly different from zero and negative at 99% 
level; for one unit increase in owner equity percentage, the log odds of being delinquent (vs. not 
being delinquent) reduces by 0.022.  By taking the exponent of the coefficient (exp(-
0.022)=0.97), it can be said that for a one unit increase in the owner equity percentage, the odds 
of default the loan change by a factor of 0.97.  Additionally, an increase of one unit in working 
capital as a percentage of the gross income is associated with a 0.002 decrease in the log odds of 
default, or for one unit increase in the working capital as a percentage of gross income, the odds 
of default change by a factor of 0.99 (exp(-0.002)=0.99).  To express these results in probability, 
the original probability of default (2.18/97.82=0.0222) multiplied by the odds ratio for the owner 
equity percentage (0.97) result in a new odd of the dependent variable of 0.0222*0.97=0.0217. 
Let x by the new probability such as x/(1-x)=0.0271 since the odds are defined as the probability 
of default (x) divided by the probability of non-default (1-x).  Solving for x results in the new 
probability of default.  Thus for an original probability of default (2.18%), a logistic b coefficient 
of 0.97 means that a unit increase in owner equity percentage decreases the probability of default 
to 2.13% (a reduction of 0.05% from the original probability).  Furthermore, an increase of one 
unit in working capital as a percentage of the gross income results in a decrease of the 
probability of default of 0.003% to 2.177.  The coefficient for the repayment capacity is not 
significantly different from zero.  
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When using the second and third definition of default, the results are very similar as shown in 
Table 1.  The likelihood ratio indicates that in both cases, the model fits significantly better than 
the reduced model.  An increase of one unit in owner equity percentage decreases the log odds of 
default by 0.024 higher compared to the coefficient of 0.022 when using the first definition. In 
other words, an increase in one unit in owner equity percentage decreases the probability of 
default by 0.06% (from 2.60% to 2.54%).  On the other hand, for one unit increase in working 
capital as a percentage of the gross income, the log odds of being delinquent (vs. not being 
delinquent) decreases by 0.001.  In this case, the coefficient is lower than the coefficient 0.002 
when using the first definition.  In probability terms, a unit increase in working capital as a 
percentage of the gross income decrease the probability of default by 0.01%.  The repayment 
capacity coefficient is again not significantly different from zero.  When comparing the 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R-Square of all three cases, it can be seen that the Pseudo-R-Square 
increased from 0.022 to 0.027 when using the second and third definition of default as dependent 
variables.  Similar results are obtained when looking at the Cragg and Uhler’s R-Square. 
However, this trend does not indicate anything.  The Pseudo- R-Square cannot be compared 
directly because they came from three different frequency distributions.  This measure will be 
helpful later. 
 
Logit Regression Results after Correcting for Outliers and Influential Points 
To asses which observations are outliers, standardize residuals were generated after the logit 
regression on the entire set of observations.  Observations were sorted from the lowest to highest 
values of independent variable and index numbers were created for each one.  Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000) indicate that there are no fast rules to indicate which residuals are “large”.  
However, by sorting the observations according to the independent variables helps to search for 
problematic residuals.  For example, for the working capital is clear that there are several 
observations that can be responsible for the lack of fit especially among the high-working capital 
observations. Moreover, the CDRC variable shows a disproportionate number of cases with large 
residuals relative to the others either for low, medium and high values while the owner’s equity 
variable shows large residuals relative to the others mostly among high-value observations.  
Thus, it is necessary to identify these observations for further inspection.  This was done by 
means of the index numbers, observations that have a Standard Pearson Residual greater than 10 
were marketed as outliers.  
 
To further analyze the cases with “large” residuals and see if these points have a strong influence 
on the estimated parameters, the Pregibon’s measure (dbeta) was employed. There are several 
points that are not well fit by the model; however, there are influential points that cannot be 
clearly identified. Thus, a cutoff point equal to 4/[n - p] was used to isolate these points resulting 
in 3578 observations.  The initial inspection of the data did not reveal any inconsistency in the 
data with the exception of few data entry errors.  The major problem encountered when applying 
these methodology was that all the default observations were included within these observations.  
Thus, it was not possible to run the model eliminating all these points as the methodology 
suggested.  These results are not surprising since the data set is highly unbalanced (97.82% non-
default and 2.18 % defaults).  It was expected that given the nature of this data set, the few 
default observations (2.18%) would have a high leverage (hi) and therefore a high dbeta value.   
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A second way to identify outliers was also employed to overcome the problem mentioned above. 
Outliers are cases with extreme values with respect to a single variable.  Thus, values of included 
variables greater than the mean plus three standard deviations or lower than the mean minus 
three standard deviations were considered outliers, and consequently were adjusted back to three 
times the standard deviation above and below the mean.  The observations adjusted using this 
method were compared to the observations identified using the dbeta measure. It turned out that 
the majority of the observations identify by the dbeta were outside the mean plus/minus three 
standard deviation range.  As a result, less than 2% (3158 observations) of all loans were 
adjusted for any of the variables employed in the regressions.  
 
Table 1 shows the regression results after adjusting for outliers in the independent variables.  The 
likelihood ratios for all three definitions of default indicate that the corrected models are 
significantly better than the one with a constant only.  When using the first definition of default, 
the coefficient for repayment capacity is still not significantly different from zero.  The 
coefficient of the owner equity percentage is significantly different from zero and negative, and 
when compared to the case without the outliers’ adjustments, the effect is slightly stronger. 
Furthermore, the probability of default for a one-unit increase in the owner equity percentage 
decreases from 2.18 % to 2.13%.  The working capital as a percentage of gross income is also 
negative and significant; however, the effect is one point stronger than the case without outlier 
corrections.  In other words, for one unit increase in working capital as a percentage of the gross 
income, the probability of default decreases by 0.01%.   For the second and third definitions of 
default, the results are similar.  The repayment capacity is not significantly different from zero. 
The other two variables are statistically significant at 99% percent level and negative as was 
expected.
8  Compared to the case without outlier adjustments, the effect of the owner equity 
percentage in both cases is stronger by 0.001 points; the effect of the working capital as a 
percentage of the gross income is also stronger by 0.001 points.   There is no difference between 
independent variables coefficients when using the second and third definitions.  In all cases, none 
of the coefficients is a large number indicating that it will take a major change to have a large 
impact on the probability of default.  When comparing the McFadden’s Pseudo-R-Square, it can 
be seen that the R-Square increased from 0.022 to 0.024 using the first definition and from 0.027 
to 0.028 when using the second and third definition of default.  These results indicate a little 
improvement in the strength of the association.  Now, the R-Square measure can be used to 
compare the model with outlier corrections against the model without correction since both 
models have the same frequency distributions of dependent variable. 
 
Square term inclusion  
Loan defaults were further analyzed by including square terms in the model.  A Box-Tidwell 
transformation (test) was conducted to check for the assumption of linearity relationship between 
the independent variables and the log odds of the dependent variable.  The test results indicate 
that the coefficient for the interaction terms, in the case of the owner equity percentage was not 
significant, while for the repayment capacity and for the working capital were significant 
indicating the presence of nonlinearity in the relationship.  Table 1 shows the logit regression 
results when square terms were included as new variables while attempting to improve the fitting 
of previous models.  For the first definition of default, the coefficient of the repayment capacity 
is negative and significantly different from zero, an important improvement. The coefficient of 
                                                 
8 The expected sign are shown in Error! Reference source not found.   14
the owner equity percentage and working capital are also negative and significantly different 
from zero.  Translating these results in probability terms, it can be said that for a one-unit 
increase either in the CDRC as percentage of the loan or in the working capital ratio, the 
probability of default decreases from 2.18 % to 2.17%.  Furthermore, for one unit increase in 
owner equity percentage, the probability of default decreases by 0.03%.  For the second and third 
definitions of default, the results are similar.  The repayment capacity is again negative and 
significantly different from zero at 99% percent level.  The other two variables are also 
statistically significant at 99% level and negative as was expected.  Compared to the case with 
outliers’ adjustments, the effect is slightly stronger.  In terms of probabilities, for a one-unit 
increase in either the CDRC as percentage of the loan or in the working capital ratio, the 
probability of default decreases from 2.18 % to 2.59%.  For one unit increase in owner equity 
percentage, the probability of default decreases from 2.18 % to 2.55% and for the working 
capital ratio to 2.58%. 
 
For all definitions of default, the square terms for the repayment capacity and for the working 
capital turned to be positive and significantly different from zero at a 99% significance level, 
while the square term coefficient for owner equity was not significant.  These results 
corroborated the outcome from the Box-Tidwell test showing a strong non-linear relationship 
between the independent variables and the log odds of the dependent variable.  The coefficients 
for the square term of debt repayment capacity and working capital indicate an increasing 
marginal effect of CDRC and working capital on the log odds of default.  Even though, these 
coefficients are very small, they are highly significant indicating the presence of a non-linear 
relationship between dependent and independent variables.  
 
Furthermore, a joint test for all square terms was conducted to confirm the non-linear 
relationship between the dependant and independent variables, to test this relationship, the 
following hypothesis was used,  the Ho: β4= 0, β5 =0 and β6=0.  The hypothesis that the effects of 
the square terms are simultaneously equal to zero can be rejected at the 0.01 level (X
2= 153.78, 
df =3, p= 0.000).  This result confirms the non-linear relationship between the dependant and 
independent variables.  Additionally, to test the equality of coefficient for the square terms, the 
following hypothesis was tested, Ho: β4= β5 =β6.  The Chi-Square test conclude that the null 
hypothesis that the effect of the square terms are equal is significant at the 0.01 level (X
2=10.49, 
df =2, p= 0.0053).  This result suggests that there is strong evidence that the effects are equal, 
however, the regression results indicate that the square term coefficient for owner equity was not 
significant.  Thus, three additional hypotheses were tested: a) Ho: β4= β5.   The Chi-Square test 
for this hypothesis indicates that the null hypothesis, that square term for the square repayment 
capacity  is equal to the square term for the owner’s equity percentage, can be rejected ( X
2=0.02, 
df =1, p= 089); b) the second additional hypothesis is Ho: β5 =β6.  The Chi-Square test for the 
hypothesis that the estimate for the square term of owner’s equity as a percentage is equal to the 
estimate for the square term of working capital can also be rejected (X
2=0.00, df =1, p= 0.9997). 
c) The Chi-Square test for the hypothesis Ho: β4=β6 indicates that effect of square terms for the 
repayment capacity and the working capital are equally significant at 0.01 level (X
2=10.40, df 
=1, p= 0.0013). 
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Models comparison based on information criterions 
To be able to compare competing models, the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC*n) and 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) were employed.  These measures of fit provide an index to 
asses whether a model is adequate.  The results of theses information criteria are shown in Table 
1.  The lowest AIC*n criterions for the first, second and third definition of default were found in 
the results from model that includes square terms.  Comparing the AIC*n criterion within the 
square terms model, the lowest value belongs to the first definition of default.  Thus, based on 
the AIC*n criterion the first definition of default in the square terms model is the most adequate 
model.  Conversely, the lowest BIC criterions for all the definitions of default are found in the 
square terms model.  The differences among BIC values from the three models are greater than 
10 for all definitions of default, thus following the strength classification developed by Raftery 
(1996), there is strong evidence favoring the square terms model over the other two models.  
Within the square terms model results, the lowest value for the BIC criterion belongs to the third 
definition of default.  The difference between the first and second definitions of default favors 
the second definition, while the difference between the second and third definition is 2.5 
indicating that there is positive evidence favoring the third definition.  Based on the lower values 
for the information criterion, the model that included the square terms was chosen.  This model 
will be used as the basic model for the following analysis. 
 
Marginal Change in the Predicted Probabilities  
Marginal changes were calculated with all the variables held at their mean and using the 
prchange command in STATA as shown in Table 2.  The first column show the change in the 
predicted probability as x changes from its minimum to its maximum.  The strongest negative 
marginal change is for the working capital ratio; thus, moving from the lowest value of working 
capital to the highest, the probability of default would reduce approximately by 0.15 holding the 
other variables at the mean.  Recall, that the marginal change is the instantaneous rate of change.  
Consequently, it does not equal to the actual change for a finite change in the working capital 
unless you are in a region of the probability curve that is approximately linear.  The smallest 
marginal change belongs to the square term for the owner equity as a percentage of the loan.  
The second column in 
Table 2 shows the change in the predicted probability as x change from 0 to 1.  In this case, the 
strongest marginal change belongs to owner equity percentage.  The marginal change for the 
other two independent variables is weaker and almost zero for the square terms.  The third 
column shows the change in predicted probability as x change from ½ units below the base to ½ 
units above.  For example for a loan that averaged in all categories, an additional one percent in 
owner equity as percentage of the loan decreases the probability of default by 0.0006.  The fourth 
column indicates the change in predicted probability as x changes from ½ standard deviations 
below base to ½ standard deviations above.  A standard deviation change in working capital ratio 
centered on the mean will decrease the probability of default by 0.01 holding other variables at 
their means.  The fifth column shows the partial derivative of the predicted probability/rate with 
respect to the given set of independent variables, while the sixth and seventh columns show the 
95% confidence interval for a discrete change.  In this sense, it is possible to say with 95% 
confidence that the true change in the default probability associated with an increase on the 
owner equity percentage is between -0.0007 and -0.0004.   
   16
Using a cutoff of 3% for classifying default, the model correctly predicted 71.72% of the loans 
that would default, 50.02% of the loans that actually defaulted and 72.30% of the loans that did 
not default as indicated by the third and fourth columns in Table 3.  The cutoff of 3 % was 
chosen because it is the closest value to the actual default rate of 2.6 %. Table 3 shows different 
cutoff points and the correctly percentage of prediction. It is clear that the cutoff point for loans 
that would default, defaulted, or did not default affects the percentage correctly predicted.  As the 
cutoff percentage increases, the sensitivity decreases while the specificity increases.  
 
Regression Result Analysis by Loan Type 
There are five types of loans: operating loans, intermediate term loans, real state loans, rural 
residence loans and commercial loans.  Operating loans are those to purchase inputs and to pay 
expenses.  These are short-term loans used to finance daily farm operating expenses such as 
labor, input costs, equipment repairs, feeder livestock, etc. Intermediate loans are those to 
finance equipment, livestock, irrigation systems, vehicles or other capital items for up to 7 years.  
Intermediate term loans can also be used for forestry harvest products, providers of farm 
marketing and processing, service contract growers and farm related businesses.  Real state loans 
are those for the acquisitions of any type of real state.  They are long-term loans, and are used to 
finance or refinance farmland purchases, improvements to farmland, and agricultural facilities 
and buildings, and land contract.  Loan terms range from 5-30 years. Rural residence loans are 
those to finance or refinance homes.  They are designed for homes on acreage, homes in rural 
subdivisions and for homes in rural towns. Sometimes, they involved lot and construction 
financing.  Moreover, commercial loans are usually a full range of loan products and services to 
agri-businesses, agricultural coops, implement dealers, and large farming operations.  However, 
for this study, the commercial loan will refer to those loans with more than 5 million dollars in 
commitment.  
 
The loans were analyzed by loan type to asses if there are any improvements in fitting the 
models and their predictions capabilities.  Using the three different default definitions, separate 
models were run for each of the loan categories.  Previous results as well as the present analysis 
by loan type show that some coefficient improves significantly when using second and third 
definition of default, however in general there are not many differences among the second and 
third definitions.  Therefore, to simplify the presentation of results, only the results for the third 
definition, that follows closely the Basel II criteria, will be explained.  The regression results 
when using the third definition of default by loan type are presented in Table 4.  In general, these 
results are consistent with those in Table 1. Notice that only four out of five loan categories are 
presented in the results, commercial loans could not be analyzed because the maximum 
likelihood estimation is not possible when the dependant variable does not vary within one of the 
categories of the independent variables.  In the case of commercial loans, the working capital as 
a percentage of gross income does not have a corresponding defaulted loan, thus the model 
cannot be fitted because the coefficient for the working capital variable is effectively negative 
infinity. Stata’s solution is to drop this variable along with all observations.  These findings 
indicate that a much larger number of default cases within the commercial loans are needed to fit 
the model for commercial loans.  
 
For the data set without corrections, the owner’s equity coefficient is always significant at 99% 
level except in the rural resident loan model.  For the operating loan model, no other coefficients   17
are significant.  The likelihood ratio has a chi-square of 207 with a p-value of 0.000. This 
indicates that the model as a whole fits significantly better than the reduced model.  Likewise, for 
the intermediate terms and rural resident loans, the likelihood ratio is also significantly better 
than the reduced one.  The coefficient for working capital is also significant at 99% level, while 
for the rural residence loans none of the coefficients are significant. These results are confirmed 
with the non-significance of the likelihood ratio. Similarly, for the data set with outliers’ 
corrections, the results are analogous with the only difference that the working capital coefficient 
is significant at 99% level for all loan types.  The likelihood ratio test is significant for all type of 
loans except for the rural residence loans. 
 
For the model with square term, all the origination ratios are statistically significant at 99% level, 
and the sign for all of the coefficients are negative for the operating and intermediate term loan 
models as shown in Table 4.  Similarly, the sign for the all square term except for the owner’s 
equity percentage are significant at 99% level and positive.  For the real state loan model, only 
the coefficient for working capital is significant at 99% level. Furthermore, only the coefficient 
for repayment capacity square term is not significant while the other square terms are significant 
at 99% level.  Real estate loans are typically long-term, thus lenders put more attention to 
borrower’s long-term assets.  This is why borrower’s repayment capacity and owner’s equity as 
percentage are not significant, suggesting that alternative variables should be incorporated to 
better fit a logit model for real state loans.  In the rural residence model, none of the variables are 
significant.  These results can be explained due to the lack of degrees of freedom when 
estimating the model since only four of the 883 loans defaulted.  This is evident when observing 
the low log likelihood (Table 4) and noting that is the only ratio that is not significant among 
loan types.  These results are expected, as rural residence loans are usually evaluated using a 
scorecard system (Featherstone et al, 2006).  
 
The results for information criteria are shown at the bottom of Table 4.  The lowest AIC*n 
criterions for the operating and real state loans belong to the model that includes square terms; 
for the intermediate loans the lowest criterion corresponds to the data set without corrections.  
Since the model for rural residence is not significant it does not matter which criterion is the 
smallest.  Thus, based on the AIC*n criterion the square term model is a better fit to model loan 
defaults. Comparing among definitions, the first definition of default would be the most adequate 
model.  Conversely, the lowest BIC criterions among definitions of default are found for the 
third definition.  When comparing the BIC criterions among loan types, the lowest values are 
found in the square terms model for the operating and intermediate loans while for the real state 
model, the lowest BIC belongs to the model with outliers’ corrections.  The differences in BIC 
between the model with outliers’ correction and without indicate strong/positive evidence that 
the model with correction is better since the BIC differences are greater than six for 
operating/intermediate loans.  For real state loans, the evidence is weak according strength 
classification scale developed by Raftery (1996).  Comparing the corrected model with the model 
that includes square term, the evidence is strong favoring the square terms model over the other 
two models for the first two types of loans, while for real state loan, the evidence suggests 
strongly that the model with outlier’s correction is better.  Based on the lower values for the 
information criterion, the model that included the square terms should be more appropriate to 
model operating and intermediate loans while to model real state loans, the model with outliers’ 
correction should be employed.    18
 
Table 5 shows the marginal change in the predicted probabilities for operating loans. The 
strongest negative marginal change belongs to the working capital ratio; thus, moving from the 
lowest to the highest value of working capital, the probability of default would reduce 
approximately by 0.18 holding the other variables at their mean.  The smallest marginal change 
belongs to the square term for the owner equity as a percentage of the loan.  When changing 
positive values alone (from 0 to 1), the strongest marginal change belongs to owner equity 
percentage.  The marginal change for the other two independent variables is weaker and almost 
zero for the square terms.  As moving from ½ units below the base to ½ units above, again the 
owner’s equity percentage has the greatest marginal change (0.0008).  A bigger change such as 
½ standard deviation below base to ½ standard deviation above in the owner’s equity will 
decrease the probability of default by 0.016 holding other variables at their means while the same 
change in repayment capacity will result in a change of 0.0113 in the probability of default.  The 
lowest marginal effect (0.0095) corresponds to a change in the working capital ratio.  The fifth 
column shows the partial derivative of the predicted probability/rate with respect to the given set 
of independent variables.  It is possible to say with 95% confidence that the true change in the 
default probability associated with an increase of the owner equity percentage is between -0.0011 
and -0.0004 for operating loans.   
 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the marginal effects on the probability of default for intermediate and 
real state loans.  The biggest marginal change in default probabilities corresponds to the working 
capital ratio for both intermediate and real estate loans, while the lowest marginal change in 
default probabilities corresponds to repayment capacity for intermediate loans and for owner’s 
equity for real state loans.  The implications of these results are straightforward for lenders. For 
operating loans, lenders should put special attention on the working capital ratio.  For 
intermediate term loans and real estate loans, lenders should put more attention to the owner’s 
equity percentage and repayment capacity respectively.  The magnitude of marginal change in 
predicted probabilities when moving up from the minimum to maximum values of independent 
variables is an indicator of the slope of the curves.   
 
The closest value to the actual default rate for each loan type is approximately 3 %, thus using a 
cutoff of 3% for classifying default, the model correctly predicted 49.14 % of the operating loans 
that would default, 68.06 % of the operating loans that actually defaulted and 49.14% of the 
operating loans that did not default as shown in Table 8.  In the case of intermediate term loans, 
the model correctly predicted 62.43% of the loans that would default, 60.73% of the ones that 
actually defaulted and 62.48% of the intermediate terms loans that did not default.  Furthermore, 
the results for real state loans and rural residence loans are misleading since they indicate that the 
model predicted correctly 92.94% and 99.43% respectively.  However, the regression results 
indicate that the model does not fit well the data.  
 
Regression Result Analysis by Association 
AgriBank is one of the districts within the Farm Credit System, and is composed by seventeen 
Agricultural Credit Associations (ACAs) that make short, intermediate, and long-term loans and 
one Agricultural Credit Bank that provide with funds and services to the local ACAs.  The 
analysis of the portfolio credit risk could be further enhanced if segmented by type of association 
since each association has its own management style and its own method to evaluate the   19
creditworthiness of borrowers.  The analysis by association could help to asses if there is any 
difference within a group of lenders that provide roughly the same products, share a common 
source of funds, and have operated as a unified entity.  With the purpose of attracting borrowers, 
the associations offer distinct type of credits relationship that are more appealing to the credit 
needs of specific types of farm borrowers. Thus, the associations could adopt different models to 
quantify credit risk and to calibrate their minimum capital requirements. The loan segmentation 
by association also helps to asses any improvements in fitting the models and their predictions 
capabilities. 
 
The regression results by association are presented in Table 9. These results found that overall 
model consistency is similar among associations.  The log-likelihood ratio test shows that the 
model a whole is significant at a 99% level for all associations.  Only three out of the seventeen 
associations (Association 8, 11 and 16) have all coefficients of the origination ratios statistically 
significant.  In the case of the Association 8, the repayment capacity percentage and the owner’s 
equity ratio are negative and significant at 99% level, while the working capital ratio is negative 
and significant at only 90% level.  In contrast, for the Association 11, the results show that both 
the repayment capacity percentage and the working capital ratio are negative and significant at 
99% level, while the owner’s equity ratio is negative and significant at the only 90% level.  The 
regression coefficients for the repayment capacity percentage and the owner’s equity ratio of the 
Association 16 are negative and significant at 95%, whereas the working capital coefficient is 
negative and significant at the 90% level.  Alongside these results, six out of the seventeen 
associations have two out of the three coefficients negative and significant, while six out of the 
seventeen associations have only one coefficient negative and significant.  The Association 6 is 
the only one that has no significant coefficients and the Association 9 was dropped from the 
analysis because none of its loans was defaulted.  These findings are a clear indicator of the 
consistency of the model across associations. Working capital was the variable that better 
behaved (twelve associations has significant coefficients) follow by the repayment capacity 
variable (nine associations), and last, the owners’ equity variable (seven associations). Overall 
results show that associations should put more emphasis on liquidity indicators, then on the 
repayments capacity of the borrowers, and finally on the borrowers’ solvency. 
 
Similarly, the sign of the square CDRC term is positive and significant for ten out of seventeen 
associations.  Contrary, the square term of the owner’s equity ratio is significant for only three of 
the seventeen associations.  However, the coefficients for the Association 12 and 14 are negative 
indicating an increasing marginal effect of owner’s equity on the log odds of default, while the 
coefficients of the Association 18 is positive indicating a decreasing marginal effect of the 
owners’ equity on the log odds of default.  This is sign of the variability among associations and 
an indicator of the non-linearity of relationship between dependent and independent variables.  
 
The analysis by association was conducted comparing three alternative models, the same way as 
the analysis by loan type.  Based on the AIC*n criterion the square term model combined with 
the third definition of default is the best mode to predict default.  The results for the information 
criterions analysis are shown at the bottom of Table 9.  The lowest AIC*n criteria for almost all 
association belong to the model that includes square terms. Within the square terms model, the 
lowest AIC*n criterion belongs to the Association 15.  Similarly, the lowest BIC criterions 
among definitions of default are found for the third definition of default, and within the square   20
terms model. These results provided strong evidence that the model using the third definition of 
default, correcting for outlier and including the square terms, is the best model to predict default 
at the associations’ level. The lowest BIC criterion belongs to the Association 14. 
 
Table 10 shows the marginal change in the predicted probabilities for Association 8.  The 
strongest negative marginal change belongs to the repayment capacity percentage.  Thus, when 
moving from the lowest to the highest value the repayment capacity percentage, the probability 
of default would reduce approximately by 0.73 holding the other variables at their mean, the 
smallest marginal change among origination ratio corresponds to the working capital percentage. 
It is interesting to see, that also the square terms displayed a considerably marginal changes in 
predicted probabilities.  The smallest marginal change of all regressors belongs to the square 
term of the owner equity percentage.  Contrasting, when changing positive values only (i.e. from 
0 to 1), the strongest marginal change belongs to owner equity percentage.  The marginal change 
for the other two independent variables is weaker and almost zero for the square terms.  As 
moving from ½ units below the base to ½ units above, again the owner’s equity percentage has 
the greatest marginal change (0.001).  The marginal change for the other two independent 
variables is weaker and almost zero for the square terms as before.  For bigger changes, such as 
½ standard deviations below base to ½ standard deviations above the base, the biggest marginal 
change belongs now to the repayment capacity percentage; it decreased the probability of default 
by 0.02 holding other variables at their means. The same change in owners’ equity resulted in a 
change of 0.01 in the probability of default.  The lowest marginal effect (0.009) corresponds to a 
change in the working capital ratio. With 95% confidence, the true change in the default 
probability associated with an increase of the repayment capacity will be between -0.0004 and -
0.002; the change in the default probability associated with a change in owners’ equity is 
between -0.0016 and -0.0003, and for working capital is between -0.0003 and 0.000. 
 
Table 11 and Table 12 show the marginal effects on the probability of default for Association 11 
and Association 16   The biggest marginal change in default probabilities corresponds to the 
working capital ratio for the Association 11 and to the owners’ equity for the Association 16 
when moving from the lowest to the highest value of original ratios.  On the contrary, for the 
same range, the lowest marginal corresponds to the to the owners’ equity for the Association 11 
and to the working capital ratio for the Association 16.  Furthermore, when changing values (i.e. 
from 0 to 1), the strongest marginal change belongs to owner equity percentage for both the 
Association 11 and Association 16.  The marginal change for the other two independent 
variables is weak, and almost zero for the square terms in both cases.  When moving from ½ 
units below the base to ½ units above, again the owner’s equity percentage has the greatest 
marginal change by -0.006 and by -0.0018 for Association 11 and Association 16, respectively.  
The marginal change for the other two independent variables is weaker and almost zero for the 
square terms as before.  When changing ½ standard deviations below base to ½ standard 
deviations above the base, the biggest marginal change is for the repayment capacity percentage 
in the case of the Association 11, and for the owners’ equity in the case of the Association 16.  
With 95% confidence level, it can be said that the true change in the default probability 
associated with an increase of the repayment capacity will be between -0.0003 and -0.0001 for 
the Association 11 and between -0.0005 and -0.0001 for the Association 16.  The change in the 
default probability associated with a change in owners’ equity is between -0.0011 and -0.000 for 
the Association 8 and between -0.0031 and -0.0005 for the Association 16; and for working   21
capital is between -0.0003 and 0.0001, and between -0.0004 and -0.000 for the Association 11 
and the Association 16, respectively. 
 
Regression Result Analysis by Payment Frequency  
There are six types of payment frequencies: monthly payment, quarterly payment, semi-annually 
payment, annually payment, variable payment and final maturity payment.  Monthly payments 
are those occurring once a month.  Quarterly payments are those occurring four times a year, 
usually March, June, September, and December. Semi-annually payments are those occurring 
twice a year. Annually payments are those occurring once a year. Variable payments are those 
whit specific installment options or special conditions regarding the frequency of payment such 
as deferments.   Finally, final maturity payments are those that have a single payment at the end 
of the loan term.  The loans were analyzed payment frequency to asses if there are any 
improvements in fitting the models and their predictions capabilities.  Analyzing the frequencies 
of payment helps to understand which of the frequency options give the borrower the best chance 
of repayment.  Consequently, it helps to assess potential repayment problems, and its influence 
on the default probabilities.   
 
The same way as the analysis by loan type and associations, three different default definitions 
were employed.  Consistent with previous results, the regression results improves significantly 
when using third definition of default.  Therefore, to simplify the exposition of results, only the 
results for the third definition and with the outlier corrections are explained.  The regression 
results by payment frequency are presented in Table 13.  The likelihood ratio indicates that the 
model as a whole fits significantly better than the reduced model for all payment frequencies 
except for the quarterly payments (p-value of 0.223).All the coefficients of all the origination 
ratios are statistically significant at 99% level, and the sign for all of the coefficients are negative 
for the annually and final maturity payment type. For monthly payment type, the sign for the all 
origination ratio are negative and statistically significant at 99% level except for the repayment 
capacity percentage. In the case of the seminally payment type, the owner’s equity percentage is 
not significant, while the other two origination ratios are negative and significant at 99% level.  
The quarterly and variable payments types do not show any significant coefficients.  These 
results are in a certain way expected since the frequency of payments differs among loans; 
typically, intermediate- and long-term loans are structured with monthly, quarterly, semiannual 
or annual payments. The majority of the observations employed in this study correspond to 
intermediate and long-term loans thus are expected to have significant coefficients for monthly, 
semiannual or annual payment types.  However, the results for the quarterly payment type are 
surprisingly. One possible explanation could be the fact that the majority of the quarterly 
payment loans are within the real state loans where only working capital is significant.  In the 
case of the variable payment type, it is not estrange that none of the variables are significant, 
since it is difficult to fit a model for loans that have especial conditions such as deferments. . It is 
preferable to have payments, which correspond with high unmodified cash inflows. 
 
Analyzing the McFadden’s Pseudo-R-Square, it can be seen that the R-Square ranges from 
0.0029 to 0.04. According to this statistic the model, the annually payment type is the model that 
shows the higher strength of association.  Furthermore, comparing the McFadden’s Pseudo-R-
Square among default definitions, results indicate that there is an improvement in the strength of 
the association favoring again the third definition of default.    22
 
Table 14 shows the marginal change in the predicted probabilities for annually payments.  The 
strongest negative marginal change, among origination ratios, belongs to the working capital 
percentage; thus, moving from the lowest to the highest value of working capital, the probability 
of default would reduce approximately by 0.17 holding the other variables at their mean.  The 
smallest marginal change belongs to the owner equity as a percentage of the loan.  Among 
square term, the negative marginal effect of the square term of repayment capacity displays a0.21 
change in predicted probability. When changing positive values i.e. from 0 to 1, the strongest 
marginal change belongs to owners’ equity percentage.  The marginal change for the other two 
independent variables is weaker and almost zero for the square terms.  As moving from ½ units 
below the base to ½ units above, again the owner’s equity percentage has the greatest marginal 
change (0.0005).  Changing from ½ standard deviations below base to ½ standard deviations 
above in the repayment capacity (the strongest marginal change) will decrease the probability of 
default by 0.0094 holding other variables at their means while the same change in working 
capital ratio will result in a change of 0.0086 in the probability of default.  The lowest marginal 
effect (0.008) corresponds to a change in the owners’ equity ratio.  The fifth column shows the 
partial derivative of the predicted probability/rate with respect to the given set of independent 
variables.  It is possible to say with 95% confidence that the true change in the default 
probability associated with an increase of the repayment capacity will be between -0.0002 and -
0.0001; between -0.0007 and -0.0002 for an increase in the owners’ equity percentage; between -
0.0001 and -0.0000 for working capital ratio. All these marginal effect correspond to Annually 
Payments.  
 
Table 15 shows the marginal change in predicted probability of default for final maturity 
payments. The biggest marginal change in default probabilities corresponds to the working 
capital ratio, while the lowest marginal change in default probabilities corresponds to the 
owner’s equity when moving from the lowest to the highest values of each original ratio.  Table 
16 displays the marginal change in predicted probability of default for monthly payments and  
Table 17 displays the marginal change in predicted probability of default for semi-annually 
payments. The strongest marginal change in default probabilities corresponds to the owners’ 
equity for monthly payments and to the repayment capacity percentage for the semi-annually 
payments when moving from the lowest to the highest value of these ratios. Furthermore, the 
lowest marginal change corresponds to the repayment capacity percentage for monthly payments 
and to the owners’ equity percentage for the semi-annually payments.  Additionally, when 
changing values i.e. from 0 to 1, the strongest marginal change belongs to the owners’ equity for 
both monthly and semi-annually payments.  The marginal change for the other two independent 
variables is weak, and almost zero for the square terms in both cases.  When moving from ½ 
units below the base to ½ units above, again the owner’s equity percentage has the strongest 
marginal change for both type of payment frequencies.  The marginal change for the other two 
independent variables is weaker and almost zero for the square terms as before.  When changing 
½ standard deviations below base to ½ standard deviations above the base, the strongest 
marginal change is for the owners’ equity for monthly payments and for the repayment capacity 
percentage in the case of semi-annually payments.  The 95% confidence interval shows that the 
true change in the default probability associated with an increase of one unit in the repayment 
owner’s equity  will be between -0.0014 and -0.0007 for monthly payments, and between -
0.0011 and -0.0002 for semi-annually payments.  The lenders can interpret these results   23
straightforward; for annually and final maturity payments, lenders should put special attention on 
the working capital ratio; for monthly payments, lenders should put more attention to the 
owner’s equity percentage and for the semi-annually payments, lenders should put more 
attention to the repayment capacity and working capital ratio.   
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Using AgriBank’s loan level data, a binomial logit model was estimated to determine the 
probability of default for any loan within the loan portfolio of AgriBank conditional on the 
realization of financial ratios.  The New Basel Accord suggested eight criteria for implementing 
risk rating system; however, due to lack of data, only three criteria were employed.  From the 
empirical analysis using the logit model, financial measures of liquidity, solvency and repayment 
capacity were found to be important determinants of the probability of default. Liquidity was 
approximate by the working capital to average gross income ratio; solvency was measured as 
owner equity as a percentage of the loan, and repayment capacity was measured as the CDRC 
percentage at the loan level. 
 
Three alternative definition of default were employed to incorporate the four conditions that need 
to be met for a loan to be considered in default. None mayor differences were observed among 
the three default definitions.  However, the regression coefficients obtained out of the 
econometric model favor the third definition of default.  The likelihood ratios indicated that the 
model as a whole fits significantly better than the reduced model.  The McFadden’s Pseudo-R-
Square improved when using the second and third definition of default as dependent variables, 
confirming that the third definition of default is the most appropriate one.  
 
Loans were analyzed to look for outliers and influential point using standard Pearson residual 
and Pregibon’s measure (dbeta), respectively. The results with the outlier’s corrections are better 
when compared against the model without corrections.  The McFadden’s Pseudo-R-Square 
increased when using the second and third definition of default.  These results indicate a little 
improvement in the strength of the association. The Box-Tidwell test showed a strong evidence 
for a nonlinear relationship between the log odds of the dependent variable and the repayment 
capacity, and the working capital variables.  The coefficients for the square term of debt 
repayment capacity and working capital indicate an increasing marginal effect of CDRC and 
working capital on the log odds of default.  Even though, these coefficients are very small, they 
are highly significant indicating the presence of a non-linear relationship between dependent and 
independent variables.  The overall results show that in all cases, none of the coefficients is a 
large number; thus, it will take a major change to have a large impact on the probability of 
default. The result of the AIC*n and BIC information criterions provided positive evidence 
favoring the third definition of default and the inclusion of square terms in the econometric 
model. 
 
The marginal changes for each variable were calculated holding the other variables at their mean.  
The strongest negative marginal change is for the working capital ratio; thus, moving from the 
lowest value of working capital to the highest, the probability of default would reduce 
approximately by 0.15 holding the other variables at the mean.  The smallest marginal change 
belongs to the square term for the owner equity as a percentage of the loan. Using a cutoff of 3%   24
for classifying default, the model correctly predicted 71.72% of the loans that would default, 
50.02% of the loans that actually defaulted and 72.30% of the loans that did not default. 
 
Only four out of five loan types were analyzed; commercial loans could not be analyzed because 
the maximum likelihood estimation is not possible when the dependant variable does not vary 
within one of the categories of the independent variable.  This indicates that a larger number of 
observations are needed to fit the model adequately for the commercial loans.  The results for the 
other loan types shows that all the origination ratios are statistically significant negative for the 
operating and intermediate term loans.  For the real state loan model, only the coefficient for 
working capital is significant.  Real estate loans are typically long-term, thus lenders put more 
attention to borrower’s long-term assets.  This is why borrower’s repayment capacity and 
owner’s equity percentage are not significant, suggesting that alternative variables should be 
incorporated to better fit the logit model in the case of real state loans.  Rural residence loans did 
no have enough default loans to estimate the model.  For operating loans, the strongest marginal 
change belongs to the working capital ratio.  In the case of intermediate loans, the strongest 
marginal change corresponds to the owner’s equity percentage, while for real state loan 
corresponds to the repayment capacity. The implications of these results are straightforward for 
lenders; for operating loans, lenders should put special attention on the working capital ratio; for 
intermediate term loans and real estate loans, lenders should put more attention to the owner’s 
equity percentage and repayment capacity respectively.  In general, i.e. using a cutoff of 3% for 
classifying default, the model correctly predicted 49.14 % of the operating loans that would 
default, 68.06 % of the operating loans that actually defaulted and 49.14% of the operating loans 
that did not default. 
 
The analysis by association helped to assess difference among groups of lenders that provide 
roughly the same products.  The regression results by association displays an overall consistency 
among associations.  Only three out of the seventeen associations (Association 8, 11 and 16) 
have all coefficients of the origination ratios statistically significant.  Six out of the seventeen 
associations have two out of the three coefficients negative and significant, while six out of the 
seventeen associations have only one coefficient negative and significant.  These findings are a 
clear indicator of the consistency of the model across associations.  Overall results show that 
associations should put more emphasis on liquidity indicators, then on the repayments capacity 
of the borrowers, and finally on the borrowers’ solvency. In the case of Association 8, the 
strongest negative marginal change belongs to the repayment capacity percentage while the 
strongest marginal change in default probabilities for the Association 11 corresponds to the 
working capital ratio and to the owners’ equity percentage for the Association 16.  
  
The regression results by payment frequency show that the model as a whole fits significantly 
better than the reduced model for all payment frequencies except for the quarterly payments.  
The quarterly and variable payments types do not show any significant coefficients.  These 
results are in a certain way expected since the frequency of payments differs among loans; 
typically, intermediate- and long-term loans are structured with monthly, quarterly, semiannual 
or annual payments. The majority of the observations employed in this study correspond to 
intermediate and long-term loans thus are expected to have significant coefficients for monthly, 
semiannual or annual payment types.  In the case of the variable payment type, it is not estrange 
that none of the variables are significant, since it is difficult to fit a model for loans that have   25
especial conditions such as deferments.  Based on these results, lenders should put special 
attention on the working capital ratio for annually and final maturity payments, and to the 
owner’s equity percentage, for monthly payments and to the repayment capacity and working 
capital ratio for the semi-annually payments. 
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Table 1: Logit Regression Result of the Probability of Default for All Loans in the Portfolio  











           b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se    
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan         0.000          -0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000        -0.005***      -0.005***       -0.005*** 
       (0.000)         (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  -(0.001)  -(0.001)  -(0.001) 
Owner equity % of the loan        -0.022***       -0.024***       -0.024***      -0.023***       -0.025***       -0.025***      -0.023***       -0.026***       -0.026*** 
       (0.001)         (0.001)    (0.001)  -(0.001)  -(0.001)  -(0.001)  -(0.004)  -(0.004)  -(0.004) 
Working/Av. Income capital        -0.002***       -0.001***       -0.001***      -0.003***       -0.002***       -0.002***      -0.005***       -0.005***       -0.005*** 
       (0.000)         (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  -  -  -  -  -  -         0.000***        0.000***        0.000*** 
  - - - - - -  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Square Owner equity % of the loan  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  - - - - - -  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Square Working/Av. Income capital  -  -  -  -  -  -         0.000***        0.000***        0.000*** 
  - - - - - -  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant        -2.417***       -2.084***       -2.082***      -2.364***       -2.024***       -2.021***      -1.923***       -1.581***       -1.577*** 
 (0.057)  (0.052)  (0.052)  -(0.061)  -(0.056)  -(0.056)  -(0.123)  -(0.111)  -(0.111) 
Num.  of  observations  158426 158426 158426 158426 158426 158426 158426 158426 158426 
Log  likelihood  -16255 -18594 -18604 -16234 -18578 -18588 -16169 -18503 -18512 
LR chi2(3)  743.46  1021.52  1023.81  784  1054  1056  915  1205  1207 
Prob  >chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden's R- Square   0.022  0.027  0.027  0.024  0.028  0.028  0.028  0.032  0.032 
Cragg and Uhler’s R-Square   0.025  0.030  0.030  0.026  0.031  0.031  0.030  0.035  0.035 
AIC*n:                       32517.385 37196.976  37216.43 32476.636  37164.917 37148.271 32351.387 37019.664 37038.795 
BIC': -707.544 -985.606  -987.886  -748.293  -1017.664  -1020.045  -884.623  -1132.998  -1135.603 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2: Marginal Change of Predicted Probabilities 
   min>max 0>1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg. Effect [  95% C.I.   ] Mean(x)  Sd(x) 
Rep. Capacity as % of the loan  -0.1040  -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0095 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 153.383  77.279 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.0812  -0.0024 -0.0006 -0.0100 -0.0006  -0.0007 -0.0004 63.232  17.317 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.1577  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0102 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 43.754  97.163 
Sq. CDRC as % of the loan  0.1469  0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 29498.400 37757.600
Sq. Owner Equity % of the loan  0.0057  0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 4298.190  2135.980 
Sq. Working/Av. Income Cap.  0.0930  0.0000 0.0000 0.0069 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 11355.100 45881.700
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of Correct Predictions for Different Cutoff Points 
Cutoff Percentage  Correct (%)  Sensitivity (%)  Specificity (%) 
1 7.37  98.33  4.94 
2 41.22  78.23  40.23 
3 71.72  50.02  72.30 
4 86.31  26.67  87.90 
5 92.18  15.23  94.23 
6 94.70  9.58  96.98 
7 95.87  5.67  98.87 
8 96.53  4.00  99.00 
9 96.93  2.55  99.46 
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Table 4: Logit Regression Result of the Probability of Default by Loan Type  
 
Standard errors in parentheses 







   No correction  Outlier correction  Square terms or model modification 
Variables/Loan Type  Operating  Int. Term  Real State  Rural Res. Operating  Int. Term  Real State  Rural Res. Operating  Int. Term  Real State Rural  Res.
           b/se             b/se            b/se           b/se            b/se            b/se             b/se           b/se            b/se            b/se            b/se           b/se   
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan        -0.000           -0.000          -0.001          -0.001         -0.000          -0.001           -0.001          -0.001        -0.004***      -0.005***       -0.002          0.136  
        (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.001)        (0.007)        (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.001)        (0.008)        (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)        (0.173) 
Owner equity % of the loan        -0.019***       -0.028***      -0.029***       -0.011        -0.019***      -0.028***       -0.029***       -0.011        -0.025***      -0.030***        0.003          0.232  
        (0.001)          (0.001)         (0.002)        (0.028)        (0.002)         (0.001)          (0.002)        (0.030)        (0.006)         (0.005)         (0.011)        (0.326) 
Working/Av. Income capital        -0.001          -0.001***       -0.001**        0.000         -0.002**       -0.002***       -0.001**        0.000        -0.005***      -0.004***       -0.003***       -0.002  
        (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.001)        (0.001)         (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.003)        (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)        (0.006) 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -         0.000***        0.000***        0.000          -0.000  
   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -       (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.001) 
Square Owner equity % of the loan  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -         0.000           0.000          -0.000**        -0.002  
   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -       (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.003) 
Square Working/Av. Income capital  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -         0.000***        0.000***        0.000**        0.000  
   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -       (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000) 
Constant        -2.185***       -1.742***      -2.325***      -4.676*       -2.123***      -1.690***       -2.265***      -4.623*       -1.639***      -1.275***       -2.895***      -21.926 
        (0.084)          (0.077)         (0.137)        (1.962)        (0.092)         (0.082)          (0.146)        (2.036)        (0.188)         (0.157)         (0.321)       (16.757) 
Num. of observations         44258           64246           48994            883          44258           64246           48994            883          44258           64246           48994            883  
Log likelihood         -6394            -8414           -3540           -25.5          -6390           -8411            -3539           -25.5          -6360           -8375           -3531           -24.1  
LR chi2(3)           207              559             233            .174       215.003        565.935         234.764          0.162            275             637             251           2.87  
Prob >chi2         0.000            0.000           0.000          0.982          0.000           0.000            0.000          0.983          0.000           0.000           0.000          0.825  
Pseudo R-squared         0.016            0.032           0.032          0.003          0.017           0.033            0.032          0.003          0.021           0.037           0.034          0.056  
AIC*n:                       12795.712  16386.106  7087.477  58.984  12787.908  16829.128  7085.492  58.996  12733.847  16764.03  7075.421 62.287 
BIC':  175.105 -525.745 -200.381 20.176 -182.909 -532.723 -202.365 58.996 -210.877  -570.61  -186.038 37.829   29
Table 5: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Operating Loans 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ] Mean(x)  Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.0957  -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0113 -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0001 156.0420  87.7879 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.1036  -0.0029 -0.0008 -0.0136 -0.0008  -0.0011 -0.0004 63.2202  17.9359 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.1877  -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0095 -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0001 30.1663  69.2144 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.1133  0.0000 0.0000 0.0116 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 32055.8000 43692.2000
Square Owner equity % of the loan  0.0282  0.0000 0.0000 0.0039 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 4318.4800 2256.6700
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.2468  0.0000 0.0000 0.0084 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 5700.5200 29295.3000
   Non-Default Default          





Table 6: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Intermediate Term Loans 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ] Mean(x)  Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.1062  -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0102 -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0001 152.9260  77.6074 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.1157  -0.0038 -0.0008 -0.0134 -0.0008  -0.0010 -0.0005 63.3411  17.4457 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.1505  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0084 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 30.8164  75.6337 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.1455  0.0000 0.0000 0.0103 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 29409.2000 37313.7000
Square Owner equity % of the loan  0.0087  0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 4316.4400 2153.6700
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.1410  0.0000 0.0000 0.0067 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 6670.0300 34058.6000
   Non-Default Default           
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Table 7: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Real State Loans 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ] Mean(x)  Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.0186  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0019 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000 151.6690  65.9364 
Owner equity % of the loan  0.0033  0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0000  -0.0002 0.0003 63.1264  16.5753 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.0477  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0047 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0000 71.0270  129.0890 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.0106  0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 27351.1000 32061.9000
Square Owner equity % of the loan  -0.0399  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0071 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 4259.6700 1998.3900
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.0231  0.0000 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 21708.4000 64115.5000
   Non-Default Default           
Pr(y|x) 0.9882  0.0118            
 
 









   Loan type 
   Operating  Int. Term  Real State   Rural Res. 
Cutoff (%)  3.0%  3.0%  3.0%  3.0% 
Correctly (%)  49.78%  62.43%  92.94%  99.43% 
Sensitivity (%)  68.06%  60.73%  13.34%  0.00% 
Specificity (%)  49.14%  62.48%  94.09%  99.89%   31
Table 9: Logit Regression Result of the Probability of Default by Association  
 
   Association Number 
Variables/Associations  2  3  4  5  6 7 8  10 
           b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se            b/se            b/se             b/se    
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan        -0.009**        -0.010**        -0.006***       -0.009           -0.001          -0.011         -0.016***       -0.001   
        (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.002)         (0.005)         (0.003)        (0.006)        (0.003)         (0.001)   
Owner equity % of the loan         0.022          -0.044          -0.009          -0.055           -0.020          -0.052         -0.054***       -0.027** 
        (0.034)         (0.023)         (0.012)         (0.045)         (0.016)        (0.032)        (0.016)         (0.009)   
Working/Av. Income capital        -0.003          -0.016***       -0.004**        -0.013**         -0.003          -0.010*         -0.009*         -0.007***
        (0.003)         (0.004)         (0.001)         (0.004)         (0.002)        (0.004)        (0.004)         (0.001)   
Square CDRC as % of the loan         0.000***        0.000**         0.000***        0.000            0.000          0.000           0.000***        0.000   
        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)   
Square Owner equity % of the loan        -0.001           0.000          -0.000           0.000            0.000          0.000           0.000           0.000   
        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)   
Square Working/Av. Income capital         0.000           0.000***        0.000           0.000**          0.000          -0.000           0.000**         0.000***
        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)   
Constant        -2.693**        -0.417          -2.296***       -1.714          -2.709***       -1.177           1.019*         -1.792***
        (1.035)         (0.663)         (0.323)         (1.440)         (0.461)        (0.962)        (0.475)         (0.263)   
Num. of observations          8577            7750           16349            5704             9626           2880            5899           21755   
Log likelihood          -605            -702           -1663            -322            -1110            -259            -631           -3215   
LR chi2(3)          52.9             108             103              21             19.5           18.4             151             188   
Prob >chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000       .00181          .00342         .00536   0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared         .0419           .0713             .03            .0316            .0087          .0343            .107           .0284   
AIC*n:                       1224.0659  1417.9517  3340.1241  658.88371  2233.1071  532.07517 1275.1097  6444.3504 
BIC': 1.4502886  -54.131616  -44.673395  30.861201  35.551139  29.41869  -99.076344  -127.89342 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 9: Continued 
 
   Association Number 
Variables/Associations  11 12 13 14 15  16  17  18 
           b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se            b/se            b/se    
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan        -0.008***       -0.005          -0.011***       -0.005***         0.012          -0.008**        -0.006          -0.009** 
        (0.002)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.002)          (0.011)        (0.003)        (0.003)         (0.003)   
Owner equity % of the loan        -0.026*          0.005           0.032           0.002           -0.061          -0.050**        -0.067**        -0.097***
        (0.012)         (0.017)         (0.036)         (0.011)          (0.043)        (0.017)        (0.023)         (0.016)   
Working/Av. Income capital        -0.010***       -0.006**        -0.008*         -0.003***        -0.043***       -0.005*         -0.002          -0.004   
        (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.004)         (0.001)          (0.012)        (0.003)        (0.002)         (0.002)   
Square CDRC as % of the loan         0.000*          0.000           0.000*          0.000***        -0.000           0.000**         0.000*          0.000***
        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)   
Square Owner equity % of the loan        -0.000          -0.001**        -0.001          -0.000*           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.001***
        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)   
Square Working/Av. Income capital         0.000***        0.000           0.000           0.000           -0.000           0.000*          0.000           0.000*  
        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)   
Constant        -1.091***       -2.043***       -2.003*         -1.803***        -3.285*          0.024          -0.531           0.079   
        (0.305)         (0.433)         (1.003)         (0.370)          (1.508)        (0.459)        (0.662)         (0.463)   
Num. of observations         13336            9564            3957           33124             2115            3879            3510           10393   
Log likelihood         -1653            -855            -528           -4461             -130            -685            -390            -882   
LR chi2(3)           210             156            67.4             309               29             99.1              42            86.1   
Prob >chi2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000       .000061    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R-squared         .0598           .0835             .06            .0335               .1            .0675           .0511           .0465   
AIC*n:                       3320.0938  1723.6308  1069.958  8936.7835  274.14781  1383.7686  794.47151  1777.1402 
BIC':  -153.41043 -100.69494 -17.741997 -247.00538 16.942271 -49.56999 6.9346053 -30.583881 
Standard errors in parentheses 








   33
Table 10: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Association 8 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ]  Mean(x)  Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.7325  -0.0026 -0.0003 -0.0229 -0.0003  -0.0004 -0.0002 172.6670  78.2474 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.3424  -0.0135 -0.0010 -0.0145 -0.0010  -0.0016 -0.0003 70.3388  14.7038 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.0561  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0092 -0.0002  -0.0003 0.0000  36.4917  55.5224 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.7372  0.0000 0.0000  0.0210 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  35935.6000 39947.5000
Square Owner equity % of the loan  0.0262  0.0000 0.0000  0.0049 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  5163.7100 1940.0200
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.8885  0.0000 0.0000  0.0085 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  4413.8500 19933.4000
   Non-Default Default           




Table 11: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Association 11 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ]  Mean(x)  Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.1929  -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0121 -0.0002  -0.0003 -0.0001 141.0130  66.2899 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.0730  -0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0102 -0.0006  -0.0011 0.0000  57.3770  17.2016 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.6176  -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0107 -0.0002  -0.0003 -0.0001 24.7745  48.3100 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.1548  0.0000 0.0000  0.0081 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  24278.6000 31298.0000
Square Owner equity % of the loan  -0.0100  0.0000 0.0000  -0.0016 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  3588.0000 1976.5400
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.9471  0.0000 0.0000  0.0107 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  2947.4600 17382.3000
   Non-Default Default           
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Table 12: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Association 16 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ]  Mean(x)  Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.1987  -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0226 -0.0003  -0.0005 -0.0001 141.3200  77.4558 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.3497  -0.0124 -0.0018 -0.0316 -0.0018  -0.0031 -0.0005 61.0753  16.9142 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.0902  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0107 -0.0002  -0.0004 0.0000  25.4953  53.5646 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.4611  0.0000 0.0000  0.0226 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  25969.1000 36369.3000
Square Owner equity % of the loan  0.1132  0.0000 0.0000  0.0104 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  4016.2100 2035.3000
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.6898  0.0000 0.0000  0.0104 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  3518.4400 17723.4000
   Non-Default Default           
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Table 13:  Logit Regression Result of the Probability of Default by Frequency Type  
 
Variables/Payment Frequency  Annually  Final Maturity Monthly Quarterly  Semi-Annually Variable 
           b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se   
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan       -0.007***       -0.006***        -0.000           -0.001          -0.012***        -0.005   
        (0.001)         (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.005)         (0.002)         (0.003)   
Owner equity % of the loan        -0.026***       -0.023**         -0.046***         0.036          -0.020           -0.027   
        (0.006)         (0.008)          (0.007)          (0.025)         (0.014)         (0.030)   
Working/Av. Income capital        -0.005***       -0.005***        -0.004***        -0.002          -0.006***        -0.007   
        (0.001)         (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.004)   
Square CDRC as % of the loan         0.000***        0.000***         0.000            0.000           0.000***        0.000   
        (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
Square Owner equity % of the loan        -0.000           0.000            0.000**         -0.000           0.000           0.000   
        (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
Square Working/Av. Income capital         0.000***        0.000***         0.000**          0.000           0.000**         0.000   
        (0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)   
Constant        -1.312***       -1.712***        -1.645***        -4.154***       -1.205**         -0.686   
        (0.186)         (0.230)          (0.209)          (0.754)         (0.430)         (0.843)   
Num. of observations         74154           28744           40114             2940           11265           1209   
Log likelihood         -7661           -3922            -4723             -439           -1357             -296   
LR chi2(3)           680             169              320             8.21              103             18.3   
Prob >chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000          .223     0.000       .00548   
Pseudo R-squared         .0425            .021            .0327           .00927           .0366              .03   
AIC*n:                       15335.615  7858.6622  9460.0549  891.89208  2728.5011  605.71645 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 14: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Annually Payments 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2  Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ]  Mean(x) Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.1244  -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0094  -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0001 154.4  75.0 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.0736  -0.0022 -0.0005 -0.0080  -0.0005  -0.0007 -0.0002 66.1  16.6 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.1726  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0086  -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 41.5  86.7 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.2168  0.0000  0.0000  0.0102  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  29467.3  36755.5 
Square Owner equity % of the loan  -0.0099  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0016  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  4645.6  2117.9 
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.1683  0.0000  0.0000  0.0071  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  9233.4  39656.5 
   Non-Default Default          




Table 15: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Final Maturity Payments 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ] Mean(x) Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.1393  -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0137 -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0001 149.9  83.1 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.0823  -0.0022 -0.0006 -0.0112 -0.0006  -0.0011 -0.0002 61.3  17.2 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.1994  -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0094 -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0001 28.6  67.6 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.1534  0.0000 0.0000 0.0121 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 29384.9 40510.7
Square Owner equity % of the loan  0.0283  0.0000 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 4053.2  2093.0 
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.2924  0.0000 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 5391.6  28315.0
   Non-Default Default          
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Table 16: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Monthly Payments 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ]  Mean(x) Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.0029  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0001 154.9  79.4 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.1921  -0.0088 -0.0010 -0.0184 -0.0010  -0.0014 -0.0007 59.5  17.5 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.1437  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0121 -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 54.1  123.6 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.0052  0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 30290.4  38612.0 
Square Owner equity % of the loan  0.1392  0.0000 0.0000 0.0095 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 3852.2  2081.7 
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.0395  0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 18192.5  61151.3 
   Non-Default Default          





Table 17: Change in Predicting Probabilities for Semi-Annually Payments 
 
   min->max  0->1   -+1/2   -+sd/2 Mg.Effect [    95% C.I.   ] Mean(x) Sd(x) 
Repayment Capacity as % of the loan -0.4362  -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0195 -0.0003  -0.0004 -0.0002 153.1  71.4 
Owner equity % of the loan  -0.0617  -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0078 -0.0005  -0.0011 0.0002 65.0  16.8 
Working/Av. Income capital  -0.2465  -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0143 -0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0001 59.4  108.8 
Square CDRC as % of the loan  0.5990  0.0000 0.0000 0.0189 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 28552.1 35656.5
Square Owner equity % of the loan  0.0106  0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 4501.6  2080.1 
Square Working/Av. Income capital  0.1036  0.0000 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 15376.3 51609.8
   Non-Default Default          
Pr(y|x) 0.9763  0.0237           
 
   38
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